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NOTE AND COMMENT
ADMIRAr.TY Rur.-.r: oF "CARE AND Cua.r:" A LIMIT oF LIABII.I'l'Y.-One of the
very ancient doctrines of the general maritime law is that a sailor injured in
the service of the ship is entitled to care and cure at the expense of the ship,
and to his wages, but nothing more in the nature of damages for negligence
of the master or others of the ship's company. In the sixth article of the
Rooles d'Oleron, for example, it is said,-"But if by the master's orders and
commands any of the ship's company be in the service of the ship. and thereby
happen to be wounded or otherwise hurt, in that case they shall be
cured and provided for at the costs and charges of the said ship.""ils doivent etre gueris et fanses sur le pout de ladite 11ef." To the same effect in the older codes commonly spoken of as the Rhodian Sea Law, see
Ashbumer, sub-title "Mariners" and elaborate discussions in Reed v. Canfield, I Sumn., 195 and City of Alesandria, 17 Fed., 390. While this rule has
been very firmly fixed in the admiralty courts, Osceola, 189 U. S., 158, there
has been debate about its enforcement in courts of the common law. A sailor suing in the admiralty for negligence of his superior officers would fail if
he had received "care and cure," Bunker Hill, I!)B Fed., 587, while at common law he might recover damages as in an ordinary action of tort.
Thompso1i v. Hermaim, 47 Wis., 6o2. See Kalleck v. Deering, 161 Mass.,
469; Hedley v. S.S. Co. [I894], A. C. 222.
In the recent case of Chelentis v. Luckenbach S. S. Co., 247 U, S. 372; 62
Laws, Ed. u71, the Supreme Court holds that the admiralty rule must pre-
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vail even where the action is brought in a common-law court. The plaintiff
was a fireman who received injuries on shipboard through being negligently
ordered to work in an exposed situation. He sued at common law for damages. He had received due care and hospital attention and made no claim
for wages. Upon these facts appearing, a verdict was directed in favor of the
defendant and affirmed on error (243 Fed., 536). The Supreme Court called up the record by certiorari and affirmed. The sailor's employment is
maritime and rights and liabilities arising thereunder must be measured by
the maritime law; that law must be uniformly applied and only the liabilities
which it imposes are cognisable in whatever courts the litigation is brought,
where the cause of action is maratime in its nature and within admiralty jurisdiction. The right to "a common-law remedy where the common ]a,;, is competent to give it," the saying clauses of the Judiciary Act, refers to remedies and
not to rights, and a right sanctioned by a maritime law may be enforced through
any appropriate remedy recognized at common law. A plaintiff, however, cannot prevent measuring·a defendant's liability by the standards of the maritime
law by bringing his action in a common-law court. Maritime rights must be
recognized there. The result is really an application of le% loci 'delicti, and it
would be an anomaly if the rights and liabilities which inhere in a maritime
tort should not be enforced in-common-law jurisdictions. In Craig v. Continental Insurance Company, 26 Fed., 798; 141 U. S. 638, an action at law, the
Limited Liability Act was enforced under a plea of the general issue, the court
taking judicial notice of its provisions as a part of the supreme law of the
land. Our maritime law is coming within the view of the second paragraph
of Article VI of the Constitution.
The word "cure" in the admiralty rule is not to be understood in a literal
sense; it is employed in its original- meaning of taking charge of, or giving
attention to, rather than absolute healing (Atlantic Abb. Adm. 451). The
obligation continues for at least the duration of the voyage, Ben Flint, l Abb.
126, and, on the Great Lakes, may logically be measured by the season of
navigation which takes the place of the voyage, Hercules, Brown's Adm. 560.
'Neglect to comply with the rule creates a serious liability for damages against
the ship for the damages sustained, Troop, n8 Fed., 76g; the rule is inapplicable where the injury was caused by personal negligence of the owner, as where there is a breach of his positive and non-deputable duty to see
'that the ship is seaworthy and her equipment in safe condition at the outset of
the voyage, S. S. Ca. v. Moss, 245 Fed., 54; and where there is negligence on
the part of the owner, contributory negligence of the injured party does not
prevent recovery but is balanced by an apportionment of the damages, (Ma%
Morris, 137 U. S. l. The general' doctrine of the admiralty in regard to injuries received on shipboard by members of the crew, including the master,
is the result of the experience of ages and commends itself to a ,sound sense
of fairness and justice. When the shipowner puts his ship in good order,
safely equipped and supplied, he should not be held personally liable for the
accidents attending her navigation over which he has no personal control.
This is the spirit of the rule of limitation of liability _of which this particular
doctrine is really an expression.
G:i>oRGJ> L. CANFttI,D.
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STATUTE OF FRAUDS INAPPLICABLE TO MARITIME CoNTRACTS.-The recent
decision of the Supreme Court -in Union Fish Co111pa11y v. Erickson (Adv.
Opinions, February I, 1919, 143) may occasion surprise although it is only
the logical outcome of the principle announced in Workman v. New York,
179 U. S., 552, and South em Pacific v. J e11sen, 244 U. S., 205. The Fish Company, a California corporation, had engaged Erickson to serve as master
of one of its vessels, in Alaska waters, for a term of not less than one year,
commencing at a future date. The contract was made in San Francisco and
was wholly in parol. It was to be performed in Alaska and on the high
seas. After a month's service the master was wrongfully discharged and
then brought suit in admiralty for the damages sustained by the breach of
contract The shipowner contended that the contract was invalid under the
statute of frauds of California, as well as of Alaska, being a parol agreement which could not be performed within one year. The Supreme Court
decides that the contract, by reason of its being maritime in its nature, is
not within the statute and ·sustains a decree in favor of the master; the uniformity of the maritime law must not be impaired by local statutes and the
validity of maritime contracts must be determined by that law alone.
The ordinary rule by which the validity of a contract is tested, including
the application of the statute of frauds, is that of the le.x- loci co11tract11s.
STORY ON CONFLICT OF LAWS §262. This, of course, may yield to the le".r loci
solutionis if the intention of the parties requires, Jacobs v. Credit-L'yomiais
12 Q. B. D., 589; and, in maritime transactions, both may be displaced in
favor of the law of the ship's flag. CARVER ON CARRIAGE BY SEA § 204. In the
Ericksoii case, however, the contract would have been invalid under either
of these three rules. It was plainly within the statute of California, if the
place where it was made determined the rule, Seymour v. Oelrichs, 156 Cal.
782; it was likewise within the statute of Alaska, if the place of performance
were resorted to, WOOD ON FRAUDS, 4g0; and the law of the ship's flag would
still leave it subject to the laws of California, since the ship was owned by
a California corporation and continued to be a part of that state and subject
to its laws, even while on the high seas. Crapo v. Kelly, 16 Wall, 610; The
Hamiltoi~, 207 U. S., 398. The di:cision, therefore, presents a new and predominating rule for testing the validity of maritime contracts, namely, the
maritime law. Local statutes may not be invoked, it would seem to follow,
either to impair or to protect maritime contracts because their validity must
be tested· by the maritime law alone. The case may have far reaching effects
and necessitate legislation on the subject of maritime contracts. The maritime law, by itself, is quite meager on the subject of the formation of contract. It has no settled doctrines of its own, in this respect, but has usually
followed local law. If a contract existed, according to the local law, and
was maritime in its nature, the admiralty had jurisdiction. Whether or not
a contract existed was determined by the doctrines of the local law. In
countries following English doctrines, for example, the admiralty would not
recognize an agreement void for want of consideration or mutuality, not because the admiralty has any rules of its own in regard to consiqeration or
mutuality, but because there was no contract by. local law where these ele-
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ments were lacking. Dennis v. Slyfield, II7 Fed., 474- On the other hand,
in countries where the English doctrine does not prevail, the absence of consideration would not prevent the admiralty enforcing an agreement otherwise
within its jurisdiction. In other words, the admiralty has not yet evolved
any law of contracts of its own except in regard to the secondary matter of
testing their maritime nature. It has left this matter of formation of contract, the essentials of its validity and the requisite evidentiary conditions,
to local law, common or statutory. Doubtless every local law, however, tends
to impair uniformity. This can only be avoided by a general code of maritime
law. Until it is promulgated, uniformity will be impossible. The logical
effect of the decision in the Erickson case will be to emphasize the necessity
for a complete revision and codification of our maritime' law. Its development has been so interwoven with local law that a somewhat chaotic situation may develop, if the effect of this decision is correctly estimated to be a
divorcement from the local law in respect of contracts before anything has
been prepared to take its place.
The principle of the decision would, it seems, have been equally fatal to
the statute of frauds if the action had been at law in a state court. A writ
of error from the Supreme Court of the United States could have been invoked to review its judgment and the same result would have followed as
is accomplished by the decision in the proceeding in admiralty.
GEORGE L. CANFIELD.
SHOULD A CORRECT VERDICT BE SET ASIDE BECAUSE THE JURY FAILED TO
Fou.ow ERRom:c>us INSTRUCTIONS ?-One of the common grounds of a new
trial is that the verdict is contrary to law. What law is meant,-the law as
it really is, or the law that was given to. the jury by the court's instruction?
Most cases hold to the latter view. It is the duty of the jury to take the law
from the court, whether the court in so giving it is right or wrong. Hence,
the jury violate their duty if they fail to follow instructions, even if the instructions are wrong, and a verdict based on a breach of the jury's duty cannot be allowed to stand, even though intrinsically correct. Talley v. Whitlock, (Ala., 1917) 73 So. 976; Gartner v. Mohan, 39 S. D. 202; Yellow Poplar
Lumber Co., v. Bartley, 164 Ky., ~63; Soderburg v. Chicago St. P. lef. & 0.
Ry. Co.,, 167 Ia., 123; Freel v. Pietzsch, 22 N. D., II3; Barton v. Shull, 62 Neb.,
570; Dent v. Bryce i6 S. C., 14; Murray v. Heinze, 17 Mont., 353.
The argument on which this rule is founded is well expressed by the
Supreme Court of Montana in Murray v. Heinze, supra, where the court said:
"But counsel for the appellant contend that, the instruction being erroneous,
the court erred in setting aside the verdict because of the fact that the jury
wholly disregarded it . . • • This is the first time it has been seriously contended in this court that the ju.ry have the right to determine the law in an
ordinary suit at law and to absolutely disregard the instructions of the court
on the ground that, in the opinion of the jury, the instructions of the court
are erroneous. If the contention of the appellant is to be upheld, what may
we not anticipate as the result in the administration of the law in this state?
If the jury may rightfully invade the province 0£ the court, why may not
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the court retaliate by invading the province of the jury in determining questions of fact? As counsel for the respondent suggest, if the contention of the
appellant is correct, then logically there is- an appeal in all cases upon questions of law from the trial court to the jury. And as counsel for respondent
further suggest; in their argument, if the jury may determine the law, an
attorney arguing the case may say to the jury: 'The court will charge you
that the law is so and so, but I say to you the court is wrong!'"
But now and then we find a case where the court refuses to be terrorized
by this reasoning. Such a case is Public Utilities Co., v. Reader (Ind. App.
1919) 122 N. E., 26. The court held that li verdict was not "contrary to law"
merely because is was contrary to an erroneous instruction givep. to the jury.
And with the Indiana appellate court stand a few others who take· the same
view. Lucken v. Lake Shore & M. S. R. R. Co., 248 Ill., 377; Pitts v. Thrower, 30 Ga., 212; Van Vacter v. Brewster, Solomon & Co., I Sm. v. M. (Miss.),
400; Cockra11e v. Winburn, 13 Tex. 143.
The argument of the majority sounds more like an excuse than a reason.
Nobody claims that the jury has the right to pass on the law, any more than
that the court has the right to do a great many thi13gs which it constantly
does and which constitute error in the trial of cases. But if it appears
that the jury was right on the law and the court was wrong, what should
be done about it?
.
The real question is, what is the purpose of the trial,-to get a correct
result, or to get it in a correct ma11ner! Thousands of errors are committed
every day by our courts in rulings made at the trial of cases, but they do not
produce new trials unless prejudice has resulted from them. It is everywhere agreed that technical error and prejudicial error are very different
things. Error which does not affect the final result is constantly ignored.
There is no potency in error as such, any more than in carelessness as such.
One can be as careless as he pleases, and if no harm comes from it there is no
liability. Courts may make endless errors in trying cases, but if no harm
comes from them they are very properly disregarded.
There is no apparent reason why the particular error here discussed should
stand on any different basis from other errors. The dreadful spectacle of an
attorney appealing to the jury to overrule the court in the law, which the
Montana court so tragically suggests, is nothing but a bogie, for it is perfectly clear that such an appeal would constitute so flagrant a contempt of
court that it could be instantly checked if anyone had the hardihood to attempt it. That being so, the rule requiring a correct verdict to be set aside
when contrary to bad instructions, must be based upon the need of punishing
the jury for disobedience. But setting aside the verdict does not punish the
jury,-it only penalizes the party who gets the verdict. It could perhaps
be suggested that the acceptance of such verdicts might develop insubordination among juries. But no such result has been noted in jurisdictions
where they are accepted. The imposition of heavy penalties is a mark of
social mat-adjustment. It was once thought that the prevention of insubordination among citizens required capital punishment for a score of
petty crimes; that military discipline could be maintained only by frightful
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punishments for the slightest cases of disobediences. Judges long contended
that the allowance of amendments would put such a premium on careless
pleading that the whole system of legal procedure would go to ruin. All
that is being gradually discarded. Destroying verdicts as a means of
disciplining inattentive or disobedient juries is on a par with shooting
hostages to subdue a recalcitrant population.
The truth appears to be that we have in this rule merely a survival of the
once common doctrine of reversal for technical error, coupled possibly with an
inherited fear that the judges, once the representatives of the king and the
privileged classes, might lose their prestige by acknowledging that a jury
could ever be right when it differed from the court. But we ar~ rapidly
losing our veneration for conventionality, and we no longer canonize rules of
procedure in theory even though in practice we still sometimes insist that
a good result is bad because it was not produced in the orthodox way. If
the courts are to merit public confidence they must think more about their
duty to the people and less about themselves, more about the justice of
their results and less about the regularity of their methods.
Exaggerated self-consciousness, in an institution as in an individual, is
always likely to produce excessive formalism. The more fully the interests of the litigants occupy the attention of the court, the more completely
will technicalities of procedure lose their power to obstruct.

E. RS.
N:iwuGtNCE - THEATERS AND SHows - AssuMP'.l'lON oF RrsK - SPtcTA'l'ORS AT A BASllBALL GAMt.-The common law right of recovery as regards one who knowingly or indifferently incurs a risk in the course of his
' employment not necessarily incident thereto finds expression in the cases of
So1ithcote v. Stanley, l H. & N., 247: Wilkinson v. Farrie, l H. & C., 631 ~
Chapman v. Rothwell, El.B. & E., 168: also CooLtY ON ToRTS, (3rd Ed.)
1042-1057. Further distinctions taken on the liability of an occupier of premises are found in the case of I11dermaur v. Dames, L. R l C. P. 274, where
the static relations between such occupiers and one injured thereon are
classified. Situations involving these questions may arise under a variety of
circumstances. Probably the greater number grow out of the relation of
master and servant. Sullivan v. New Bedford, etc., R. Co., 190 Mass., 288:
American Car and Foundry Co. v Duke, 218 F~d. 437. In a recent decision,
the Supreme Court of Washington was called upon to determine whether one
who pays admission to the grand stand to see a baseball game, knowing the
nature of the game and having a choice of screened or exposed seats, choosing a seat exposed to wild throws and foul balls, may show in evidence as
proof of negligence, defendant's plans for the park, which called for screens
to protect the area in which he sat. The court held the evidence admissible
and that the plaintiff's right to recover was properly submitted to the jury
who found in his favor. Kavafian v. Seattle Baseball Club Association
(Wash. 1919) 177 Pac. 776.
Cases precisely in point are few. In Wells v. Min11eapolis Baseball an.a
Athletic Association, 122 M\nn. 327, 142 N. W. 7o6, it was held that if plain-
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tiff chose an unprotected seat, it was properly submitted to the jury to
determine whether in so doing she had assumed any risk arising from defendant's failure to protect the area where she sat with screening. In Cra11e v.
Kansas City Baseball Exhibitio11 Company, 168 Mo. ·App. 301, 153 S. \V.
1076, the court upheld a directed verdict for defendant on the theory that
defendant having provided a choice of protected and unprotected seats had
performed its duty and that plainti,ff in choosing an exposed seat assumed the
risks incident thereto. In Edli11g v. Ka11sas City Baseball Exhibition Company, 181 Mo. App. 327, 168 S. W .. go8, it was held a question for the jury
to decide whether or not plaintiff had been guilty of contributory negligence
or had assumed the risk of being hit by a ball in taking a scat in the protected portion of the stand but in line with a defective opening in the screen.
The jury decided in favor of the plaintiff. These cases all agree with and
contain statements similar to the general proposition laid down in Crane v.
Kansas City, supra, where the court says ''We think the duty of the defendants toward their patrons included that of providing seats protected by
screening from wildly thrown or foul balls for the use of patrons who desire
such protection." To what extent is this necessary? In the principal case
the court says concerning appellee's choice of an unprotected seat, "by inference he was invited to that seat. There was an implied representation on the
part of appellant that the seat he (plaintiff) took was reasonably safe." Such
doctrine would impose upon defendants the burden of protecting those seats
which in the usual course of the game would be within the ordinary range of
the ball. In the Cra11e Case, supra, the court said, "Pefendants fully performed that duty (to provide protected seats) when they provided screened
seats in the grand stand and gave plaintiff an opportunity of occupying one
of those."
In Wells v. Minneapolis, supra, the court says ''We believe that as to all
who with full knowledge of the danger from thrown or batted balls attend
a base ball game, the management cannot be held negligent when it provides a choice between a screened and an open seat, the screen being reasonably sufficient as to extent and substance." In Edling v. Kansas City,
supra, under somewhat different circumstances the injury being due to a
defective opening in the screen, the court says, "Being in the business of providing a public entertainment for profit, defendant was bound to exercise
reasonable care to protect its patrons against such infuries. * * * The
courts of this state have always adhered to the doctrine
* that where
one person owes a duty to another, the person for whose protection the duty
exists cannot be held to have assumed the risks of injury created solely by a
negligent breach of duty."
In substance, the Crane Case imposes a duty upon the defendants to afford
a choice of protected or exposed seats and that having done so its duty is
at an end. The Minnesota court in the Wells Case adds to this requirement
that the screening must be reasonably sufficient as to extent. The Edling
Case goes farther and refuses to exonerate defendant on the theory that the
plaintiff has assumed the risk if it be shown defendant owed plaintiff a duty
to protect him against the injury. A distinction should, however, be made

*

*
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between the Edling Case and the others. In tha~ case, defendant had recognized a duty to protect the area in which plaintiff sat but had negligently
allowed the secreen to become defective. In this connection the words of
Montague Smith, J. in Crafter v. Metropolitan Railway Compgny, L. R. I
C. P. *304 are in point. He says, "The line must be drawn * * * between
suggestions of possible precautions and evidence of actual negligence such as
ought to reasonably and properly be left to a jury."
The cases all agree that defendant is not an insurer of plaintiff's safety
and is therefore under no duty to screen the whole stand. They are equally
well agreed that defendant is under a duty to provide some protection against
the dangers of the game even as to those who attend with full knowledge
of these dangers. The test applied in the Cran!! Case imposing an obligation
to afford a choice of protected or exposed seats is no doubt of some value
as evidence in deciding in a given case whether or not plaintiff in choosing
an exposed seat assumed the risk of being hit. As a criterion for determining the extent of the area defendant is duty-bound to screen, it has no merit.
On one occasion a small attendance may find ample room behind a very limited screen, while on others with a capacity audience, the defendant would
be bound to screen all the seats if those attending were to have an opportunity of occupying protected seats. On the one hand, a strict application of
the doctrine of assumption of risk would preclude a recovery in a majority
of instances where plaintiff knew the dangers incident to the game. On the
other hand, denying its applicability to such cases as these would tend to
throw the entire burden on the defendant. Experience has shown that the
sections of the stand directly behind the batter, and for a distance along the
first and third base lines to be those exposed to the greatest danger. It is
the occupants of these seats who are most apt to feel the driving effect of a
pitched ball deviated from its course by glancing off the bat. In imposing
an absolute duty on the baseball ass_ociation to protect its patrons against
this danger, the courts will have fixed the relative rights and liabilities of
the parties in a manner consistent with legal theory an~ practical application.

A. B. T.
ENEMY ALIEN LI'tIGAN'rs IN 'l'HE ENGLISH LAw.-It is said that as a
general rule an enemy alien cannot bring an action in the English courts.
"And true it is, that an Alien enemie, shall maintaine neither reall nor personall action, Do11ec terrae f11et' communes, that is untill both Nations be
in peace." CoKE ON LI'.rTLE'rON, (2 ed.) L. 2, c. II, sec. 198. LoRD SrowELL's
famous dictum in The Hoop (1799), I C. Rob. lg6, 200, is regarded as a
classical statement of the doctrine: "In the law of almost every country, the
character of alien enemy carries with it a disability to sue, or to sustain in
the language of the civilians a persona standi it~ judicio. The peculiar law
of our own country applies this principle with great rigour.-The same principle is received in our courts of the law of nations; they are so far British
courts, that no man can sue therein who is a subject of the enemy, unless
under particular circumstances that pro hO.c vice discharge him from the character of an enemy; such as his coming under a flag of truce, a cartel, a pass,
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or some other act of public authority that puts him in the King's peace pro
hue vice." Perhaps the most useful recent discussion of the law on this question is to be found in the opinion of LoRD CHIEF JUSTICE RltADING in Porter
v. Frcude11bcrg [I915], l K. B. 857, 866. There is an exhaustive review of
the authorities in Rodrig21ez v. Speyer Br-0thers (i918), 88 L. J. K B. 147,
discussed infra. See also 16 MICH. L. Rltv. 621. For a comparative study of
the law and practice of different countries, see GARNER, "TREATMENT OF
ENEMY ALIENS,'' 13 AM. JoUR. OF INT. LAW 22-59.
The general rule has been deprived of much of its original significance
by the progressive tendency of the courts to mitigate the harshness of its application. It is applied, for example, only to parties plaintiff. An enemy alien
may be sued as a defendant, and when sued he has a right to enter an appearance and defend the action. Ro'flinson & Co. v. Continental Insurance Company of Mannheim [I9I5], l K B. 155· If the decision goes against him he
has a right to appeal. Porter v. Freudenberg, s11pra. As applied to parties
plaintiff the principle is qualified by many important exceptions. LoRD S'.l.'oWEI.I, suggested that an enemy alien might be discharged from his enemy
character pro hue vice if he entered the realm under a flag of truce, a cartel,
a pass, or some other act of public authoritj capable of putting him in the
King's peace. The Hoop, supra. In the case of The Mowe (1914), 84 L. J.
P. 57, Sm SAMUEI. EVANS laid down the rule that an enemy alien claiming
any protection, privilege, or relief ·under the Hague Conventions of 1907
should be entitled to appear as claimant and argue his claim before the prize
court. There is considerable authority for the proposition that an enemy
alien may sue en mitre droit, e.g., as administrator or executor. Richfield v.
Udal (1679), Carter 48, 191; l WII,r,IA:Ms ON EXECUTORS, (6 Am. ed.) 269,
270 note. In at least one instance an enemy alien has been admitted to prove
a debt under a commission of bankruptcy in order to protect his right to a
dividend. Ex parte Boussmaker (18o6), 13 Ves. 71. By all odds the most
important exception is the rule, long established, that an enemy alien may
sue in the King's courts if he is in the realm by license of the crown. Wells
v. Williams (1697), r Ld. Raym. 282; l BAc. .rum., (S ed.) 83; 84. License
may be either express or implied. It was implied from the fact of registration under the Aliens Registration Act and Order of 1914- Princess Thurn
and Taxis v. Moffitt [1915], l Ch. 58. And the license implied from such
registration was not revoked but on the contrary was strengthened by internment. Schaff~t1ius v. Goldberg [1916], r K B. 284. It has been sug- ·
gested that license would probably be implied from the circumstance that an
enemy alien, in pursuance of prescribed procedure, had applied for and been
granted exemption from internment on condition. P1cc10TO, 27 YAI.it LAW
JoUR. 169. In brief, it would seem that, as regards enemy subjects residing
or carrying on business in the realm, the number to whom the courts are
closed under modern conditions has become almost negligible.
As regards enemy subjects residing or carrying on business in other cotmtries, it is by no means universally true that they are denied a perscma standi
fo j11dicio. In the first place, the test of enemy character is place of resid,ence
or business rather than nationality. Porter v. Freudenberg, supra. See 16
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MICH. L. ~v. 256. Thus an action has been maintained by a partnership
carrying on business in an allied country, although one of the partners was
an enemy subject residing in an allied or neutral country. In re Mary Duchess of Sutherland (1915), 31 T. L. R. 248, 394- See Janson v. Driefontein
Consolidated Mines Ltd. [1902], A. C. 484. 505. In the second place, enemy
subjects residing or carrying on business in an enemy country may sometimes be joined as co-plaintiffs as a matter of form where the action in substance is brought to protect the rights of English subjects. In Mercedes
Daimler Motor Co. v. Maudslay Motor Co. (1915), 31 T. L. R. 178, a patent
had been vested jointly in an English company and a German company by
a deed which provided that the English company should have the sole right
of bringing actions for infringement and might join the German company
in such actions as co-plaintiff. An action was allowed to proceed in the name
of the two companies on the ground that it was in substance for the protection of the English company. In Rombach Baden Clock Co. v. Gent & So11
(1915), ~ L. J. K. B. 1558, a German subject resident in Germany and his
two sons, one a: German subject resident in England, and the other a natural•
ised Englishman, had carried on a partnership business in England. After
the outbreak of war the naturalised Englishman commenced proceedings for
dissolution and was appointed receiver. He was permitted in the principal
case to bring in action in the name of the firm to recover a debt due the
partnership.
The significance of the recent decision of the House of Lords in Rodrig11ez v. Speyer Brothers (1918), 88 L. J. K. B. 147, may be adequately appreciated in the light of the authorities reviewed above. In this ca$e the plaintiff firm was. a partnership of six persons one of whom was a German subject resident in Germany. The firm "had carried on a banking business in
London before the outbreak of war. The dissolution of the firm by the outbreak of war made it necessary to get in the assets and wind up the partnership affairs. An action was brought in the name of the firm to recover
a debt due from the defendant. Judgment was signed against the defendant
in default of appearance. It was attempted to have this judgment set aside
on the grotmd that one of the plaintiffs was an enemy alien and so incompetent to sue in the King·s courts. The House of Lords decided, by a vote
of three to two, that the rule against the bringing of actions by enemy aliens
did not apply.
·
The majority recognized the general rule. "There is no doubt that, as a
general rule, an alien enemy cannot bring an action in the King's Courts as
plaintjff, although he may, of course, be made a defendant. The rule seems
to have its origin in two considerations. First, that the subject of a country
then at war with the King is, in this country, unless he be here with the
King's permission, es-lex, and that he cannot come into the King's Courts
to sue any more than could an outlaw; and, secondly, that the King's Courts
will give no assistance to proceedings which, if successful, would lead to the
enrichment of an enemy alien and therefore would tend to provide his country
with the sinews of war." Per LoRD CHANCELLOR FINLAY, 88 L. J. K. B. 147,
151. The general rule was conceived by the majority to rest fundamentally
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upon public policy. VISCOUNT HAI.DANE pointed out that courts are guided
by public policy in applying rules of at least three different types; (1) the
public policy involved may never have crystallised into a definite or exhaustive
set of propositions and will control only where the particular circumstances
disclose the mischief which the policy seeks to prevent, e.g., the rule as to
wagers in the days when wagers were enforced; (2) the public policy involved may haye partially precipitated itself into definite rules of law but
the rules have remained subject to the moulding influence of the real reasons
of policy from which they proceeded, e.g., the rule as to covenants in restraint of trade; (3) the public policy involved may have become completely
crystallised in definite and exhaustive rules of law which can be changed
only by statute, e.g., the rule against perpetuities. The Lords were divided
in opinion as to whether the general rule that an enemy alien cannot sue in
the King's courts should be placed in the second or in the third category
above. LoRD CHANCEI.I.OR Frnr.AY, VISCOUNT HAI.DANE, and LoRD P ARMOOR
held the opinion that it should be placed in the second category. Consequently, when confronted with a situation in which the application of the
rule would have done more harm to British subjects or friendly neutrals than
to the enemy, they found no difficulty in recognizing an exception and permitting the enemy alien to be joined as a co-plaintiff in order to get in the partnership assets. The "balance of public convenience" was distinctly in favor
of making an exception to the general rule.
LoRn ATKINSON and LoRD SUMNER, on the other hand, regarded the rule
as belonging to the third c;.i.tegory. In their opinion the enemy alien's incapacity to sue is a well established personal disability depending neither
upon the nature of his claim nor upon the result of his suit, if successful,
in enriching him or benefiting his country. "This rule of our law, like many
other of our rules of law, was, no doubt, originally based upon and embodied
certain Yiews of public policy; but in this case, as in many others, the principles of public policy so adopted have, as numerous authorities conclusively
show, crystallised, as it were, into strict and rigid ·rules of law to be applied,
to use LoRD STowr:r.:r.'s words, 'with rigour.' If that be so, as I think it
clearly is, then the cases establish that it is wholly illegitimate for any judicial tribunal, which may disapprove of the principles of public policy so embodied in the rigid rule, to disregard that rule in any particular case and base
its decision on other principles of public policy of which it more approves.
To do so would be to usurp the prerogative and powers of the Le,,,oislature,
since it is the function of the Legislature, not of judicial tribunals, to discard the principles embodied in such rules, and in its enactments embody
others which it prefers." Per LoRD ATKINSON, 88 L. J. K. B. 147, 163. ''I
think that it would be difficult to find another rule so little qualified over so
many centuries. When first we hear of it, not long after the beginning of
recorded decisions, it was already clear. We never find it emerging from
doubt into certainty under the influence of successive decisions, if that is what
is meant by 'crystallising'; it has always been as certain as language could
make it, as curt as the Commandments. It has never been doubted; the
current of decision has run strong and steady and always the same way. It
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has always been a rule of personal disability." Per· LoRD SUMNER, 88 L. J.
K. B. 147, 176.
.
LoRD SUMNER'S choice of a metaphor was not exactly a happy one. In
the light of the authorities reviewed briefly at the beginning of this note,
it .would seem that the ancient rule as to enemy alien litigants could have
been more appropriately presented as an obstruction which has been yielding
gradually to the eroding current of a more liberal principle. Looking at the
question from this point of view, the real significance of the decision rendered by the majority in Rodriguez v. Speyer Brothers becomes apparent.
Not only does the decision ·add another exception of considerable importance
to a rule that is already well on. the way to being engulfed in its exceptions,
but it establishes beyond peradventure that the rule is not rigid and that it
remains subject to the moulding influence of the real reasons of public policy
from which it has proceeded. In effect, the eroding process is approved and
may continue unobstructed in the future.

E. D. D.

